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SYMPOSIUM 
WE ARE WHAT WE TAX 
FOREWORD 
Mary Louise Fellows,* Grace Heinecke** & Linda Sugin*** 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 12 and 13, 2015, the Fordham Law Review hosted a 
symposium entitled We Are What We Tax.  We invited scholars with a wide 
array of expertise inside and outside of the tax arena to consider how tax 
laws have shaped public and private institutions, cultural norms and 
hierarchies, and societal values.  The symposium has two distinct aims. 
The first is to explore the effect on the body politic of tax systems that 
give reality to things that might not otherwise exist and make invisible that 
which is beyond taxation.  Academics and policymakers (elected and 
nonelected alike) generally have a narrow economic and instrumentalist 
conception of tax laws.  For them, taxes are a tool at the ready to address 
both fiscal and nonfiscal problems.  In contrast, this collection of articles 
treats tax as a constitutive and a creative component of a nation’s cultures, 
values, and institutions. 
The far-reaching conception of tax law advanced in this symposium 
means that all legal areas of study and all disciplines outside the law have 
the potential to provide indispensable insights into a tax system and its 
impact on those subject to it.  Therefore, the second aim of the symposium 
is to include the perspectives of nontax and nonlaw scholars.  We asked 
each tax scholar to suggest a topic that would address the role tax laws play 
in defining, explaining, and forming society.  With a tax scholar’s thesis in 
hand and in collaboration with that contributor, we identified a nontax 
scholar who had an interest in either coauthoring or presenting a paper on a 
related topic.  The symposium demonstrates that economics, history, 
 
*  Everett Fraser Professor of Law, Emerita, University of Minnesota Law School.  In 
addition to their articles published here, we are grateful to all the symposium participants for 
two days of rich, interdisciplinary, and thought-provoking discussion.  We also want to thank 
the Volume 84 Board of the Fordham Law Review for their unwavering dedication in 
preparing the symposium for publication.  This foreword provides an overview of the 
symposium entitled We Are What We Tax held at Fordham University School of Law. 
**  J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; Executive Symposia Editor, 
Fordham Law Review, Volume 84. 
***  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. 
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sociology, and many areas of legal scholarship outside of tax have much to 
add to the debates taking place among tax scholars and policymakers. 
We hope these contributions prompt tax scholars to engage in more 
robust analysis as they consider and reconsider well-known tax approaches 
and issues and that nontax scholars begin to appreciate how tax law 
implicates their seemingly unrelated fields.  The contributors’ reconception 
of tax laws as affected by and reflected in a nation’s cultural values and 
social institutions challenges traditional approaches that treat taxes as an 
overlay on existing economic arrangements.  Their articles most 
importantly demonstrate that the premise that We Are What We Tax 
fundamentally changes conventional understandings of tax systems and 
their significance in the lives of those who live under those tax systems. 
We have organized the articles into the following four categories:  (1)  
how and why tax progressivity gets undermined, (2)  how reality gets 
translated into a tax system, (3)  how tax expenditures realign the functions 
of the public and private sectors, and (4)  how a self-assessment tax system 
has produced a crisis in the legal profession.  This organization 
demonstrates the breadth of the topics considered in this symposium as it 
enhances understanding of related theses.  Significantly, it also reveals how 
the articles interconnect with each other through the frequently recurring 
themes of economic inequality, fairness, and social justice. 
I.  HOW AND WHY TAX PROGRESSIVITY GETS UNDERMINED 
Contributors Goldburn P. Maynard Jr.1 and Timothy K. Kuhner2 explore 
the unremitting sympathy for tax policies promoted on the promise of 
economic growth and the relentless opposition to a progressive tax that 
holds the promise of restraining inequality.  Maynard, relying on cognitive 
psychology, explains—in the context of the attacks on the United States’s 
wealth transfer taxes—why narratives about the “capable, smart, and 
hardworking” entrepreneur, however misleading, “trump science,” “become 
entrenched,” and lead to support and defense of the “social status quo,” 
including the “dominance of the wealthy in society, irrespective of the 
perceiver’s own group membership.”3  Kuhner’s far-reaching discussion of 
liberal and social democracies situates progressive taxation measures within 
neoliberalism.4  He details how, since the 1970s, “neoliberalism [has] 
brought about the ‘“economization” of political life’ for the purpose of 
‘capital enhancement.’”5  He looks to campaign finance rules in both 
presidential democracies and party finance rules more common to 
parliamentary systems of governance to show how “market interests and 
 
 1. See generally Goldburn P. Maynard Jr., Perpetuating Inequality by Taxing Wealth, 
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2429 (2016). 
 2. See generally Timothy K. Kuhner, The Corruption of Liberal and Social 
Democracies, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2453 (2016). 
 3. Maynard Jr., supra note 1, at 2448. 
 4. See generally Kuhner, supra note 2. 
 5. Id. at 2455–56 (quoting WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS:  NEOLIBERALISM’S 
STEALTH REVOLUTION 17, 22 (2015)). 
2016] FOREWORD:  WE ARE WHAT WE TAX 2415 
ideologies” have hijacked state power and how the neoliberal agenda of 
“privatization, deregulation, and physical austerity” has led to high levels of 
economic inequality and political disempowerment.6 
Symposium contributor Victor Fleischer, investigating the effect of 
various tax policies that lower the rate of tax on entrepreneurial income, 
considers some of the same issues that Maynard raises.7  Fleischer at the 
outset notes the absence of “empirical evidence to support a claim that taxes 
have a significant effect on entrepreneurship,” “job creation,” and 
“economic growth.”8  He posits that “[e]ntrepreneurship has long been 
recognized as a kind of ideology—with both positive and negative 
connotations” and that the “prevalence of ideology over evidence is hardly 
a new problem.”9  Fleischer goes on to argue that just as policymakers do 
not subject “constitutional rights like freedom of religion, freedom of 
speech, or democratic governance” to a “cost-benefit analysis,” they 
similarly treat “the effect of [low] taxes on entrepreneurship as a matter of 
faith, not reason.”10  He warns, however, that “how one thinks about 
economic freedom” should not “dictate how one thinks about taxes,” 
because it “confuses how we should think about risk, inequality, and merit 
in an entrepreneurial economy.”11  He concludes that “[t]he strongest 
argument that entrepreneurship holds a special place in our legal system is 
one grounded in institutional economics.”12  Fleischer urges policymakers 
to shift their focus from low taxes on entrepreneurship to issues of social 
mobility and the wider range of institutions necessary to support an 
entrepreneurial economy.13  With the tax code put to the side, he ultimately 
envisions an “economy that maximizes opportunities.”14 
Symposium participants David Clingingsmith and Scott Shane, in 
response to Fleischer, directly address the relationship between increases in 
individual tax rates for high-income taxpayers and productivity by looking 
to the nexus between changes in tax rates and entrepreneurship.15  They 
present an extensive review and critique of both U.S. and non-U.S. 
empirical studies regarding the effect of changes in individual tax rates on 
entrepreneurship.  Clingingsmith and Shane reveal the intractable 
theoretical and practical issues embedded in the studies and conclude that 
the extant studies do not provide significant support for either the claim that 
higher rates deter, or that lower rates spur, entrepreneurship.  Like 
Fleischer, but for different reasons, Clingingsmith and Shane advise against 
 
 6. Id. at 2460 (quoting Claus Offe, The European Model of “Social” Capitalism:  Can 
It Survive European Integration?, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 437, 447 (2003)). 
 7. See Victor Fleischer, Job Creationism, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2477 (2016). 
 8. Id. at 2479. 
 9. Id. at 2485–86. 
 10. Id. at 2486. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 2488. 
 13. See generally id. 
 14. Id. at 2489. 
 15. David Clingingsmith & Scott Shane, How Individual Income Tax Policy Affects 
Entrepreneurship, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2495 (2016). 
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using tax rates to encourage entrepreneurial activity.  Given that the 
“population of entrepreneurs whose activities create substantial 
employment and productivity growth is small,” they argue that 
governments should not use “the blunt instrument of [reducing] individual 
income tax rates,” but instead should “address[] this population directly 
through targeted policies.”16 
Contributors Ajay K. Mehrotra and Julia C. Ott address incursions on 
progressivity under the U.S. tax law by exploring “the origins and early 
development of our current capital gains tax preference.”17  The primary 
purpose of their article is to explain “[h]ow . . . this preference persisted for 
nearly one hundred years through numerous permutations of federal 
economic policy and countless changes to the federal income tax code.”18  
They demonstrate “that the preference is not a timeless or transhistorical 
concept, but rather a historically contingent one—a concept that has been 
shaped not purely by economic logic, but rather by political compromise 
and social experience.”19  Their examination of “particular critical junctures 
in the path-dependent development of the [capital gains] preference” 
demonstrates “how the preference has endured because of changing 
political and social conditions.”20  Mehrotra and Ott also “shed light on 
broader historiographical questions about the rise and fall of different 
guiding principles of [the] American political economy.”21  They 
“challenge the conventional historical wisdom that Keynesian economic 
thinking dominated the post-World War II period only to give way to the 
emergence of neoliberalism in the 1970s and afterward.”22  By providing 
evidence “that it is not simply wealthy and elite American taxpayers and 
their representatives who have supported this tax law,” they explain the 
“provision’s persistence” as resulting not only from “seemingly inexorable 
economic reasoning,” but also from “political forces and institutional 
inertia.”23  Their work does more than further “our present understanding of 
the capital gains tax preference.”24  It also echoes some of the same issues 
raised by the other four contributors when it addresses our current structural 
conceptions “of risk, wealth, and opportunity.”25  Moreover, Mehrotra and 
Ott’s investigation of a specific tax rule in the furtherance of the 
symposium’s theme that We Are What We Tax uncovers “bigger questions 
about the causes and consequences of epistemic shifts and economic 
transformations.”26 
 
 16. Id. at 2516. 
 17. Ajay K. Mehrotra & Julia C. Ott, The Curious Beginnings of the Capital Gains Tax 
Preference, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2517, 2522 (2016). 
 18. Id. at 2520. 
 19. Id. at 2521. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 2522. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 2521. 
 26. Id. at 2523. 
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In the United States, at least in more recent decades, even a moderately 
high progressive tax system remains a fiercely contested issue and 
seemingly beyond reach.  For purposes of the theme of this symposium—
We Are What We Tax—all six of these contributors provide strong evidence 
that the promotion of economic growth as a justification for low tax rates on 
the wealthy corresponds to and reinforces U.S. taxpayers’ perceived 
“legitimacy of the established hierarchy.”27  Further, the contributors’ 
analyses of progressivity versus economic growth raise two other issues:  
Has U.S. tax policy diminished the cultural aspiration for economic 
equality?  If not, can and should economic inequality be checked through 
government spending—as opposed to tax—policies?28 
II.  HOW REALITY GETS TRANSLATED INTO A TAX SYSTEM 
Contributor Tsilly Dagan uses the theme of the symposium as an 
opportunity to investigate the consequences of a tax system that necessarily 
“entails[] comparisons of people and their behavior[,] the assessment of 
individual attributes[, as well as] interpersonal interactions and social 
institutions[,] and the translation of all of these” into the “systemic 
phenomenon” she calls the “currency of taxation.”29  She addresses 
identity-related aspects of a measurement of income designed to distinguish 
that which encompasses the “domain of tax” and that which “lies beyond its 
perimeters.”30  Dagan argues that “[i]n determining what does and does not 
count for tax purposes, the currency of taxation takes a stand about who we 
are (and who we should be).”31  As she says, it establishes a “‘normative 
taxpayer,’ thereby also impacting what we consider normal and what we 
consider unique.”32  It also “creates material incentives for certain 
resources, behaviors, and relationships, which are constitutive of human 
identity and thus actively support[s]” those very aspects of human 
identity.33  Even more central to her identity-related concerns is that “the 
conversion of reality into the currency of taxation may, in itself, raise 
identity-related issues,” because of “the commodifying nature of the 
currency of taxation” and “the involvement of the government in the 
process.”34  She selects four tax issues to illustrate the currency of taxation 
and its effects:  (1)  the deductibility of “commuting expenses,” which 
“spotlights the underlying assumptions regarding ‘normal’ aspects of an 
individual’s identity”; (2)  the distinction made between “gifts and barters,” 
which “draws attention to tax’s role in shaping interpersonal interactions”; 
(3)  the tax treatment of the “Israeli kibbutz,” which “exemplifies the 
interaction between tax and our constitutive communities”; and (4)  
 
 27. Maynard Jr., supra note 1, at 2449. 
 28. See id. at 2451 (arguing that repeal of the estate tax could be used as a “bargaining 
chip in broader budget negotiations”). 
 29. Tsilly Dagan, The Currency of Taxation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2537 (2016). 
 30. Id. at 2538. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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“personal-based international taxation,” which “demonstrates tax’s effect on 
the political institutions to which we belong.”35  Through a consideration of 
issues relating to deductions (commuting expenses), income inclusion 
(gift/barter distinction), incorporated communities (kibbutz), and the reach 
of a tax system’s jurisdiction (international taxation), Dagan argues “that 
the seemingly technical ways in which tax operates have some crucial 
effects on taxpayers’ identities, our communities, and political 
institutions.”36  Further, she shows that the “canonical understanding” that 
the income tax is “an instrument for achieving the (at times conflicting) 
objectives of maximizing social welfare and promoting distributive justice” 
ignores the effects that the tax “may have on our personal and collective 
identities” and fails to appreciate that the conversion of human actions and 
interactions into the currency of taxation “is neither neutral nor technical in 
nature; rather, it involves considerable normative choices.”37 
Bruce G. Carruthers’s article, written in conjunction with Dagan’s, 
considers how public revenue systems can “serve as an instrument of 
cultural expression.”38  Unique to this collection of articles, Carruthers 
primarily examines sin taxes.  His work has a particular saliency to the 
symposium’s theme of We Are What We Tax and Dagan’s work because it 
investigates taxes that, by their very nature, explicitly reflect a 
government’s normative choices.  “Just as personal income taxes recognize 
and give quantitative measure to various human attributes, resources, and 
interactions, excise taxes are also a precise numerical measure to 
stigmatized consumption . . . of market-based goods and services.”39  An 
excise tax on what government deems undesirable consumption 
“can . . . serve as an instrument of cultural expression”40 in that “taxation of 
stigmatized activity shares the stigma with the tax revenues, while at the 
same time mitigating that stigma because the problematic activity is now 
directly and publicly burdened with a tax.”41  Carruthers also considers how 
“budgetary earmarks can further mitigate the stigma by ensuring that at 
least some sin tax revenues support valuable and praiseworthy public 
policies.”42  Carruthers and Dagan both recognize that “[t]hrough its system 
of taxation,” a government “renders the private economy legible[] [and] 
recognizes some of its moral features.”43 
Contributor Sloan Speck, in his examination of the tax classification of 
business entities, confronts the difficulties a tax system faces when 
translating the legal, financial, and social realities of various forms of 
 
 35. Id. at 2539. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; id. at 2546, 2545. 
 38. Bruce G. Carruthers, The Semantics of Sin Tax:  Politics, Morality, and Fiscal 
Imposition, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, 2569 (2016). 
 39. Id. at 2571. 
 40. Id. at 2569. 
 41. Id. at 2574. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 2579. 
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business entities into an income tax system.44  Taking into account changes 
in law, financial markets, business practices, and globalization, he 
challenges commentators and the U.S. Department of the Treasury for their 
reliance on “efficiency considerations” as the “guiding principle in 
determining an entity’s tax classification.”45  He argues that, “while 
important, efficiency considerations should not function as the sole arbiter 
of the boundary between corporate and conduit tax treatment.”46  To do so 
ignores the fact that “classical corporate taxation is, in many ways, deeply 
embedded within a larger network of legal and social meanings.”47  
Moreover, the “intuitive appeal” of “efficiency” may “mask significant 
empirical uncertainties about behavioral responses, especially if 
policymakers possess limited information, have difficulty reversing 
inapposite decisions, or face other constraints.”48  For Speck, incongruities 
between social understandings and the “correct” policy from an efficiency 
perspective signal places where tax law may be “misaligned with other 
areas of law.”49  In these instances, Speck advocates consideration of 
“social understandings” as “a way to resolve policy questions . . . where 
economic factors, such as incidence or net efficiency consequences, are 
uncertain or unclear.”50 
Whereas conventional tax analysis concerns itself with how much or how 
little a tax system or set of tax rules might affect economic activity, these 
three articles demonstrate the limitations of so narrow an approach to tax 
policy matters.  The contributors make clear that the translation of reality 
into an operational tax creates, changes, and distorts that reality.  They also 
put policymakers on notice to appreciate that technical components of a tax 
system, regardless of the nature of that tax, inevitably implicate normative 
choices and social understandings. 
III.  HOW TAX EXPENDITURES REALIGN 
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 
A governmental body can accomplish its policy goals by appropriating 
funds directly to those in the private sector.  Alternatively, it can 
accomplish those same goals by providing tax relief to private persons or 
entities.  This tax relief is conventionally referred to as a tax expenditure to 
denote that it operates as the equivalent of a direct governmental subsidy.51 
 
 44. Sloan G. Speck, The Social Boundaries of Corporate Taxation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2583 (2016). 
 45. Id. at 2584. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2584–85. 
 49. Id. at 2596. 
 50. Id. 
 51. In the context of the U.S. federal income tax, Stanley S. Surrey introduced the idea 
of tax expenditure analysis in 1967. See Stanley S. Surrey, The United States Income Tax 
System—The Need for Full Accounting, in TAX POLICY AND TAX REFORM:  1961‒1969, at 
575, 575‒85 (William F. Hellmuth & Oliver Oldman eds., 1973). For further elaboration of 
tax expenditures by Surrey, see STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); 
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985).  For examples of 
2420 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Contributors Linda Sugin52 and Rob Atkinson,53 in their discussion of the 
U.S. tax law’s treatment of charities and donations to them, move well 
beyond the efficiency-type criticisms typically lodged against tax 
expenditures.  Contributors Lisa Philipps,54 in her discussion of the 
Canadian law’s tax incentives for personal saving, and Martha T. 
McCluskey,55 in her discussion of state tax incentives to business, do the 
same.  Presupposing We Are What We Tax, all four of these contributors 
unmask the power of tax expenditures to realign the functions of the public 
and private sectors.  They further show how the realignment serves the 
wealthy, threatens the security of the less wealthy, and produces class 
identities. 
Sugin, as she pays close attention to the rhetoric surrounding the law of 
charity—including U.S. tax treatment of charities—rejects and then 
reformulates traditional understandings of charitable institutions, charitable 
donations, and the related tax exemptions and deductions.  Relying on case 
law, legislative history going back to England’s Statute of Charitable Uses, 
and current tax approaches, she shows how the legal discourse focuses on 
the public nature, public interest, and public functions that the contributions 
support and the organizations serve.56  Sugin challenges this public 
construction of the tax law of charity.  She identifies how the tax law 
affirms the “private creation, private governance, and private funding of 
exempt organizations.”57  She further demonstrates how the tax law of 
charity rejects a notion of tax in which “individuals are not entitled to their 
entire pre-tax income because part of that income is the return to social 
cooperation that must be shared with others.”58  Instead, she persuasively 
argues that the tax law embraces the “appropriation conception” of the 
income tax in which “individuals are [morally] entitled to their pre-tax 
income and that society has no presumptive right to any part of it, despite 
its essential role in the creation of all income.”59  She uses a number of 
examples to support this aspect of her thesis, such as generous tax benefits 
 
more recent considerations of tax expenditure analysis primarily focusing on the U.S. federal 
income tax, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be 
Divorced from a Normative Tax Base?:  A Critique of the “New Paradigm” and Its 
Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135 (2010); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the 
Congress:  How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 52. See Linda Sugin, Rhetoric and Reality in the Tax Law of Charity, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2607 (2016). 
 53. See Rob Atkinson, Liberalism, Philanthropy, and Praxis:  Realigning the 
Philanthropy of the Republic and the Social Teaching of the Church, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2633 (2016). 
 54. See Lisa Philipps, Registered Savings Plans and the Making of Middle-Class 
Canada:  Toward a Performative Theory of Tax Policy, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2677 (2016). 
 55. See Martha T. McCluskey, Framing Middle-Class Insecurity:  Tax and the Ideology 
of Unequal Economic Growth, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2699 (2016). 
 56. Sugin, supra note 52, at 2608 (referring to Charitable Uses Act 1601, 43 Eliz. 4 
(Eng.)). 
 57. Id. at 2614. 
 58. Id. at 2617. 
 59. Id. 
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for donation of appreciated assets,60 tax deductible donations to foundations 
or funds that donors “continue to control,”61 and case law and legislation 
designed to “enforce donor’s gift restrictions” and “expectations,” which, in 
effect, “treat donors as equivalent to owners.”62 
As Sugin emphasizes, “It is not a problem that charity is private.  It is a 
problem that charity is private and coated with a public rhetoric,” because 
the “combination creates a bias against taxation” and the contraction of “the 
scope of government.”63  From that understanding of the effect of the 
rhetoric surrounding the law of charity, she extends her thesis in two critical 
ways.  One is to argue that “[a]nyone who turns to charity for distribution 
cannot really be committed to distributive justice because the law of 
charity—which is fundamentally private—is not designed to make charities 
effective in distributing.”64  This part of her analysis relies on John Rawls’s 
theory of justice to maintain that “[j]ust distribution is possible, but only if 
government is willing to use the coercive power of taxation to address 
inequality.”65  The second is to put forward a framework for how to 
determine the proper sphere for charitable institutions.  Starting from the 
perspective that it is “better to ask what government is not suited to do,” she 
embraces a role for charity to “challenge and check government” and 
support “[m]ovements for social change, the arts, and religion.”66  She 
reasons that once “government fully funds its responsibilities,” the need to 
embrace the “rhetoric of publicness” vanishes and the “disparate values and 
goals” of private institutions can thrive without the government, through the 
tax law and otherwise, imposing an unwarranted level of scrutiny.67 
Atkinson, who looks to a broad range of philosophers—including, but 
not limited to, Ayn Rand, Thomas Aquinas, and John Stuart Mill—further 
examines the question raised by Sugin concerning “the liberal state’s proper 
philanthropic role” and its justified place in our legal and fiscal systems.68  
He shows how philanthropy simultaneously includes both private and 
public aspects:  “[P]hilanthropy is the work not only of private parties, 
alone and in private philanthropic organizations, but also of an activist state, 
a philanthropic republic.”69  He sees philanthropy as resolving the tension 
between too much state control and too little state control and serving as 
common ground to holders of moral views across the political spectrum.70  
While he acknowledges a distrust of democracy, he concludes that “it is 
better for the work of philanthropy to be done by the state than for that 
 
 60. Id. at 2618. 
 61. Id. at 2619. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 2620. 
 64. Id. at 2620–21. 
 65. Id. at 2626. 
 66. Id. at 2627. 
 67. Id. at 2627–28. 
 68. Atkinson, supra note 53, at 2633. 
 69. Id. at 2637 (citations omitted). 
 70. See generally id. 
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work to be left undone.”71  Atkinson extends the symposium’s theme of We 
Are What We Tax by setting out the “distinct economic functions of the 
modern liberal state,”72 grounding “an ethics of philanthropy . . . in both the 
Western Classics and the Abrahamist Scriptures,” showing how “this ethic 
can accommodate both religiously respectful agnostics . . . and morally 
rational theists,”73 and establishing a framework to determine how 
philanthropic we as philanthropists “want our liberal state to be.”74  His 
liberal state offers opportunity and guarantees individual freedom, 
accommodating philanthropy in the process.75  Atkinson’s consideration of 
philanthropy, through an examination of the proper role of the state, 
enhances the force of Sugin’s thesis at the same time that it enriches the 
distributive justice questions raised throughout this symposium. 
Philipps and McCluskey also address distributive justice and the proper 
allocation of responsibilities between the state and private actors.  Looking 
at two quite different types of tax incentives in two quite different 
jurisdictions, they both conclude that tax policies have shifted economic 
risk from the state to the working and middle classes, leaving them more 
financially insecure with insufficient recourse to their government for relief.  
Both contributors demonstrate the inadequacy, ineffectiveness, and 
incompleteness of the government’s policy responses to economic 
insecurity and inequality.  Both also interrogate how these responses 
negatively affect the identities of members of the working and middle 
classes and lower their expectations for financial security for themselves 
and their families. 
Philipps’s study of the “rise of tax incentives for saving as a prominent 
feature of Canadian personal tax policy over the two decades from 1995 to 
2015” demonstrates that the “presentation, design, and language of [what 
are referred to as] registered savings plans have shaped the content of 
middle-class identity, including the behaviors, expectations, and aspirations 
that condition membership in this identity group.”76  Her approach, which 
builds on Judith Butler’s performative theory of gender, treats tax policy 
“as actively producing rather than simply reflecting preexisting 
understandings of the middle class.”77  After outlining the influence of 
“consumption tax theory, fiscal federalism, and neoliberalism,” in the 
creation and expansion of tax-preferred registered savings plans, Philipps 
raises serious questions about the effectiveness of these tax expenditure 
provisions, highlighting the lack of evidence that household savings have 
increased or that economic insecurity has decreased.78  Her point, though, is 
not only that the tax rules reflect bad public policy as government no longer 
 
 71. Id. at 2673. 
 72. Id. at 2641. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 2664. 
 75. See id. at 2633. 
 76. Philipps, supra note 54, at 2677–78. 
 77. Id. at 2678.  With regard to her reliance on Judith Butler, see as an example JUDITH 
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:  FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (2006). 
 78. Philipps, supra note 54, at 2685. 
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takes responsibility for “leveling the playing field” and instead plays the 
role of “an investment partner who gets involved only in proportion to the 
private initiative of individual savers.”79  Her analysis goes further to show 
how the registered savings plans “present an image of middle-class 
individuals exercising choice and agency, achieving financial goals through 
rational planning and self-discipline.”80  As Philipps writes, the expectation 
of rewards in the “future enables tax law to posit an aspirational middle-
class subject as an ideal that might not be experienced in the present but is 
always in the process of being realized.”81  She acknowledges that the 
registered savings plans have garnered “widespread acceptance.”82  She 
argues, however, that their popularity “is due in part . . . to the normative 
ideal of middle-class identity that [the registered savings plans] have helped 
to produce—one based on choice, agency, and the promise of future social 
mobility for oneself or one’s children through self-discipline and self-
management.”83  To have one of these registered savings plans confers “a 
form of cultural recognition that [goes] beyond its capacity to meet material 
needs.”84  She concludes that these plans are likely to remain part of the 
Canadian tax law “not because they actually deliver the benefits they 
promise to most people but rather because they have been assimilated into 
Canadian middle-class identity.”85 
McCluskey addresses some of the same issues raised by Philipps in her 
examination of the resources state and local governments accord private 
businesses.  McCluskey observes that governmental jurisdictions have 
redirected their “support away from ordinary workers, families, and 
consumers toward protecting concentrated private market wealth as the 
primary engine of economic prosperity.”86  She further contends that 
current policies, including tax policies, make the economic well-being of 
the middle class dependent “not on hard-earned private rights to personal 
resources or public rights to social citizenship, but rather on discretionary, 
trickle-down spillovers from superior economic players.”87  She describes a 
“neoliberal vision that embraces government support as a foundation of 
economic success, but insists that success depends on redirecting 
government support away from ordinary workers, families, and consumers 
toward protecting concentrated private market wealth.”88  To support her 
arguments, she draws attention to an array of state and local policies aimed 
at providing a favorable business climate.  Acknowledging the political and 
economic pressures on localities to offer these tax giveaways,89 she 
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assembles substantial data to show that large multinational corporations, 
rather than local firms owned and operated by middle-class entrepreneurs, 
enjoy a substantial share of the tax subsidies.  She also explains that the 
middle class, even with the hope of employment, however long or short 
lasting, ends up paying for “corporate welfare” through higher taxes, 
reduced public spending, and reductions in public employment—including 
layoffs and reductions in employee pensions and health insurance 
benefits.90 
In her last example of governmental jurisdictions shifting resources away 
from the middle class and toward private capital, McCluskey reveals the 
depth and breadth of the incursions on the middle class’s economic 
security.  She describes a tax incentive program, launched in 2013 in New 
York, “making the state’s public higher education institutions ‘tax-free 
development zones.’”91  The program includes a ten-year exemption from 
many different state taxes, such as business taxes and local commuter taxes.  
For five years, it even exempts from state taxation the “personal income of 
all new employees,” with a less generous exemption extending another five 
years.92  As McCluskey starkly explains, the state has decided to leverage 
public universities—a public resource central to middle-class 
opportunity93—in its efforts to attract qualifying “high-tech businesses and 
start-ups.”94  She views this form of subsidy to private business as risky, 
because it raises the very real potential that market and political pressures 
will compromise academic freedom and independence.  As important, the 
example she uses raises a warning about the incremental, and apparently 
unchecked, growth of tax expenditures for the benefit of private capital.  
Not only do the tax expenditures constrain government’s ability to provide 
public goods, they also effectively can facilitate private enterprise’s capture 
of existing public resources.  McCluskey’s analysis of local and state tax 
policies leads her to conclude that “we need a different tax story that makes 
public support for the economic and social well-being of the vast majority 
of citizens the benchmark for reasonable and responsible tax policy, not a 
presumptively unproductive ‘distortion.’”95 
Even as they embrace dissimilar methodologies across diverse subjects, 
each of these four contributors provides important insights into the 
appropriate allocation of responsibilities, as between public and private 
spheres, for the well-being of the polity.  The contributors examine, in 
distinctive ways, how tax expenditures have introduced instability in the 
distinctions between public and private goods, public and private action, 
and public and private ownership.  They also show that the instability of the 
public/private dyad in turn exacerbates economic inequality.  As the 
contributors challenge the privatization of public resources and 
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responsibilities, they persuasively demonstrate that governmental 
jurisdictions have inexorably relied on the rhetoric of the public good to 
adopt tax policies that disproportionately benefit the moneyed classes.  
Philipps and McCluskey additionally show that tax policies produce 
working-class and middle-class identities that enhance the interests of the 
wealthy. 
IV.  HOW A SELF-ASSESSMENT TAX SYSTEM 
HAS PRODUCED A CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
The contribution to the symposium by John S. Dzienkowski and Robert 
J. Peroni shifts focus away from the substantive aspects of tax systems and 
instead focuses on the practical operation of the tax law.96  Their conviction 
that “[t]he United States faces a tax-avoidance crisis that seriously 
undermines the integrity and effectiveness of the federal income tax 
system” prompts their rigorous examination of the historical and current 
role of tax advisers, particularly the role of tax attorneys.97  In keeping with 
the symposium’s theme of We Are What We Tax, their analysis establishes 
the significant negative impact the administration of the U.S. federal 
income tax has had on legal ethics and the legal profession itself. 
They demonstrate that early debates were dominated by tax practitioners 
and scholars who approached the role of the tax adviser philosophically 
with a focus on the “voluntary, self-assessment tax system that was enacted 
through democratic processes and that presumably reflects the democratic 
values of American society.”98  Dzienkowski and Peroni further explain 
that the “Cold War environment” and the recognition of the “need for the 
United States to be prepared for another major armed conflict” placed a 
check on the introduction of “parochial concerns of the legal profession” as 
tax practitioners addressed ethical standards.99  Dzienkowski and Peroni 
recognize that the tax bar likely had an interest in elevating its “status” and 
“reducing the influence of litigators” in the “development of legal ethics 
codes.”100  Nevertheless, among the various legal specialties, such as tax, 
banking, and securities—all of which developed in tandem with the growth 
of the regulatory state before and after World War II—they note that a 
“significant segment of [tax] professionals” were among the first to argue 
that “they owed duties to the system . . . as well as to their clients.”101 
Over the years the American Bar Association (ABA) issued ethics 
opinions tightening the standards regarding tax advice provided to a client, 
and the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Congress 
federalized the regulation of professional conduct, including providing for 
penalties and a tax return disclosure system.  As Dzienkowski and Peroni 
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explain, these efforts were not sufficient to avoid “two major waves of tax 
shelter abuses”—one that “began in the 1960s . . . and lasted until the mid-
1980s” and the other that “began in the late 1990s and continued into the 
2000s.”102  With their description of the most recent wave of tax shelters, 
they demonstrate the dramatic change in tax lawyers’ professionalism.  
According to Dzienkowski and Peroni, this change can be attributed to 
“[s]tructural changes in the practices of professionals in the modern global 
economy,” exemplified by accounting firms’ failed efforts in the 1990s, 
thanks to the ABA, to provide multidisciplinary services in the United 
States.103  Notwithstanding the general limitation on providing legal 
services to their clients, accounting firms could expand into and compete 
with attorneys in the tax area, because decades earlier the Treasury and IRS 
had authorized accountants to provide tax advice.  Dzienkowski and Peroni 
also cite other aspects of the market pressures facing tax practitioners.  In 
particular, they describe the economic stress on various departments in 
large law firms to produce revenue in the face of the Great Recession of the 
mid-2000s and the decision of many corporations to reduce their reliance on 
expensive outside counsel through expansions of their own legal 
departments.104  Finally, in contrast to cultural attitudes and influences in 
other countries, Dzienkowski and Peroni look not only to the tax abusive 
conduct of the tax bar, corporations, and wealthy taxpayers, but also to 
Watergate and ensuing political scandals, unpopular wars, and partisan 
attacks on the tax system and the IRS.  They conclude that over time the 
social norms necessary to sustain the U.S. self-assessment tax system have 
been undermined severely.105 
Dzienkowski and Peroni show that the forces leading to significant and 
substantial tax evasion have to do as much with the fraying of social norms 
as they do with the internal operation and administration of a tax system.  
They propose reform measures to counteract the economic stresses and 
incentives leading tax advisers to engage in aggressive tax avoidance 
activity.  Of course, even Dzienkowski and Peroni would agree that a rife of 
other big and small changes in civil society is necessary before the hostility 
toward government, government regulation, and taxes subsides and the 
crisis in the professional conduct of tax advisers abates. 
CONCLUSION 
The contributors, through a range of specific topics, investigate how tax 
laws propagate a constrained understanding of ownership and productivity 
and establish class identities along a dignity spectrum in which those with 
accumulated wealth are deemed more worthy than others.  They also 
challenge the conventional distinctions between labor and capital, 
individuals and community, and public and private.  This foreword 
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highlights and underscores the impact and import of their work.  Our hope, 
as organizers, is that this symposium, especially in light of the contributors’ 
rich analyses, will stimulate studies of other income tax issues, such as the 
doctrine of realization; treatment of debt; tax accounting, especially the 
coordination of income and expenditures to earn that income; and the 
distinction between business and personal taxation.  We would add to that 
list the issue of valuation, which plays an outsized role in a number of 
different tax systems, including income taxes, wealth transfer taxes, and 
property taxes.  The work of the contributors, with their innovative and 
creative approaches to the theme of We Are What We Tax, has provided a 
strong foundation on which to build this new area of inquiry. 
